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Introduction
Accompanying the trend of China’s economic rise, concern has beengrowing in the international community about the potential impactof China’s authoritarian regime on human rights and democracy in
neighbouring societies and even globally (Gat 2007; Diamond 2009;
Kurlantzick and Link 2009; Ambrosio 2010; Chang Mau-Kuei 2011; Wu 2012;
Pillsbury 2015; Nathan 2015). Its impact on the media’s liberal practices is
one of the issues attracting the most attention (Sciutto 1996; Link 2002;
Ma 2007; Cook 2013; Hsu 2014; Kawakami 2015). In this regard, the Tai-
wanese experience warrants attention. After two decades of improvement
in the post-democratisation era, Taiwan’s media freedom seems to have
been eroding since the late 2000s, when Taiwan began engaging in closer
economic cooperation with China. According to Freedom House and Re-
porters Without Borders, Taiwan’s press freedom shows a deteriorating trend
from 2008 to the present (see Figures 1 and 2). (1) In particular, Freedom
House fears the “potential direct or indirect influence of the Chinese gov-
ernment on free expression in Taiwan” when the “commercial ties between
Taiwan and mainland China deepened in 2010 with the signing of the Eco-
nomic Cooperation Framework Agreement.” (2) Amnesty International also
notes that the “concentration of ownership of media outlets raised concerns
about freedom of expression and editorial independence” in Taiwan. (3) These
phenomena motivated this paper’s main inquiry: Through what mechanisms
does China extend its authoritarian influence into the extra-jurisdictional
media?
Existing literature rarely suggests a theoretical framework systematising
the mechanisms by which the Chinese government exerts its influence on
other countries’ media. Some studies explore how China encouraged other
countries, especially authoritarian and developing states, to adopt the so-
called “China model” of authoritarian capitalism. Beijing’s general tactics
include offering diplomatic support at the United Nations, building new in-
ternational institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, pro-
viding economic aid without human rights obligations, establishing Confu-
cius Institutes globally, and expanding Chinese official media and other
pro-Beijing media abroad (Kurlantzick and Link 2009; Kurlantzick 2013; Pills-
bury 2015; Nathan 2015). These studies enhance understanding of the gen-
eral dynamics of the China model’s transnational diffusion. However, in
regarding the media as only one of Beijing’s comprehensive instruments to
exercise influence overseas, they identify few specific mechanisms for
China’s influence over media abroad.
Other studies examine how the Chinese government has controlled the
media within its own sovereign territory. In China, the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) enforces administrative censorship on the media with political
and legal penalties. It has also mastered the media through the “commer-
cialisation of censorship,” in which censorship is “outsourced” to private
media companies by threatening them with economic repercussions. Both
political and economic threats have generated “fear-induced self-censor-
ship” in China (Link 2002; Kurlantzick and Link 2009). A similar phenomenon
has occurred in Hong Kong. Without the legal right to directly intervene in
Hong Kong’s media, the Chinese authorities have still achieved a similar
pattern of self-censorship in Hong Kong through physical assaults, cyber-
attacks, threatening lost advertising, and transferring media ownership to
pro-Beijing figures (Sciutto 1996; Ma 2007; Cook 2013). These studies im-
prove understanding of the mechanisms through which the CCP manipu-
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lates the domestic media. They may also inspire our thinking about how
China affects media abroad. However, it is doubtful whether the mecha-
nisms operating within China could apply to Taiwan and other countries de
facto independent of China.
Further studies investigate how the Chinese government influences the
Taiwanese media. Based on experiences in Taiwan, the approaches Beijing
has generally adopted to urge Taiwanese media to exercise self-censorship
have been identified, including offering them embedded advertisements,
buying the copyrights of TV programs from them, encouraging pro-Beijing
businesspeople to purchase media in Taiwan, and pressuring Taiwanese jour-
nalists and media owners, among others (Cook 2013; Hsu 2014; Kawakami
2015). These studies offer a sufficiently detailed explanation of China’s in-
fluence mechanisms on the Taiwanese media. However, they do not provide
a theoretical framework potentially transferrable and applicable to other
countries. This is because, from the perspective of the “ladder of abstraction”
(Sartori 1970), the mechanisms identified by these studies remain largely
factual and require further abstraction to the level of theory.
To fill the aforementioned gaps, this paper proposes a theoretical frame-
work to systematise the mechanisms through which the Chinese govern-
ment extends its authoritarian influence on the extra-jurisdictional media.
A case study on Taiwan’s experience will then be conducted to examine the
effectiveness of the proposed theory.
The transnational diffusion of Chinese
censorship: A theoretical framework
By integrating Kurlantzick and Link’s model of the “commercialisation of
censorship” with Wu Jieh-min’s model of the “China factor” influence mech-
anism, this paper constructs a theoretical framework systematising the
mechanisms through which the Chinese government spreads its censorship
extra-territorially. According to Kurlantzick and Link, the “commercialisation
of censorship” is a modern authoritarian model of media control created
by the CCP early in the twenty-
first century. In this model, censor-
ship in China was not only
implemented through traditional
political and legal penalties but has
also been largely “outsourced” to
private media companies by
threatening them with economic
repercussions, such as losing sub-
sidies and advertisements. Fearing
political and economic punish-
ment, China’s media tend to exer-
cise self-censorship on topics
deemed sensitive to the Chinese
authorities (Kurlantzick and Link
2009). According to Wu Jieh-min,
the “China factor” is the process by
which the Chinese government ex-
erts political influence on other
countries by absorbing them into
its sphere of economic influence.
In particular, Beijing generally cre-
ates a structure in which the target
country becomes economically dependent on China, establishes govern-
ment-business networks with the country, develops a group of local collab-
orators there by offering privileges and special interests, and finally employs
these collaborators to achieve Beijing’s intended goals in local society (Wu
2016).
Based on these two models, this paper’s theoretical framework identifies
three steps by which the Chinese government “outsources” its censorship
to private media companies abroad. These three steps correspond with three
levels of analysis, comprising the international, sectoral, and corporate lev-
els. Relevant analytical categories and their dynamic relations are discussed
below (see Figure 3).
The first step is to create an asymmetric economic structure at the inter-
national level, making the target country economically dependent on China.
As a rising regional hegemon, China seeks to establish an alternative inter-
national order in the region and even globally to compete with the existing
American hegemony. As the “China factor” model suggests, economic in-
fluence is the fundamental means by which Beijing exerts political influence
and fulfils its political goals in other countries. To spread its ideas and prac-
tices abroad, China thus endeavours to maintain its economic advantage
over other countries. Following the same logic, the transnational diffusion
of Chinese censorship must originate in such economic domination.
The second step is to co-opt media capitalists at the sectoral level to be-
come Beijing’s local collaborators in the target country. While the “China
factor” model indicates local collaboration as an important mechanism re-
alising China’s political goals abroad, the “commercialisation of censorship”
model suggests that economic incentives and threats have become major
instruments for Chinese censorship to be “outsourced” to private media
companies. Taken together, Beijing typically incorporates local media capi-
talists as its collaborators to exercise Chinese censorship in the target coun-
try, either by providing them with financial resources in the Chinese
circulation, advertising, and capital markets, or by threatening to cease of-
fering such interests.
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Figure 1 – Taiwan's press freedom scores by Freedom House











Note: The higher the score, the lower the level of press freedom. Source: Freedom House, “Detailed Data and Sub-Scores 1980-2016,”
2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press (accessed on 7 March 2017).
The third step is to implement
and routinize external-oriented self-
censorship at the corporate level in
the target country. Assisted by local
media capitalists, the corporate and
market structures of the target
country’s media tend to accommo-
date Beijing’s mass communication
policies. Such structural changes
may finally encourage journalists in
the target country to routinize self-
censorship in favour of Beijing in
the news editing process.
Based on this proposed theoreti-
cal framework, this paper argues
that a media company outside
China will exercise self-censorship
on Chinese-sensitive topics when
it becomes commercially tied with
the Chinese market. To examine
the proposed theory, a case study
will be conducted on Taiwan’s ex-
perience. Process tracing is used as
the study’s principal method, as it is competent to divide the theoretical
link between cause and effect into smaller steps, seek empirical evidence
for each step, and confirm the effectiveness of the proposed causal mech-
anism (George and Bennett 2005). Several Taiwanese media companies are
selected as the subjects, including the Want Want-China Times Media
Group, United Daily News (UDN), Sanlih E-Television (SET), and Formosa
Television (FTV). Applying the principles of purposive and quota sampling,
the former two and the latter two are respectively selected to represent
pro-Chinese unification and pro-Taiwanese identity media in Taiwan. The
experiences of some other media companies are also discussed in the case
study. Archives, interviews, and secondary literature gathered through field-
work in Taiwan are the main sources of research data. The interview data
are based on semi-structured interviews with 22 media journalists (includ-
ing media managers, journalists, non-governmental organisation activists,
and government officials) in Taiwan during the first half of 2014.
Reinforcing an economic dependence
structure across the Taiwan Strait
From no later than the 2000s, Taiwan has become increasingly economi-
cally dependent on China. Taiwan signed a series of free trade agreements
with five Latin American diplomatic allies (Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador,
Honduras, and Guatemala) in the 2000s, with China in 2010, with New
Zealand in 2013, and with Singapore in 2013. Taiwan also signed an invest-
ment agreement with Japan in 2011 and continued negotiating with the
US over the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. Among these
countries, China developed the strongest economic influence over Taiwan,
replacing the US and Japan as Taiwan’s largest trade partner from 2005 until
the present. As Figure 4 shows, China was responsible for 22.67% of Taiwan’s
total trade in 2015, while the US and Japan respectively accounted for
11.92% and 11.39%, and Singapore, New Zealand, and the five Latin Amer-
ican diplomatic allies represented only 4.79%, 0.25%, and 0.16% respec-
tively. (4) China also replaced the US as Taiwan’s largest export market in
2004. (5) As Figure 5 shows, in 2000, the US accounted for 23.42% of Tai-
wanese annual exports, whereas China was only responsible for 2.89%.
However, as Taiwanese annual exports to the US dropped to respectively
represent 14.67%, 11.46%, and 12.21% of total Taiwanese annual exports
in 2005, 2010, and 2015, Taiwanese annual exports to China rapidly rose to
21.99%, 28.02%, and 25.40% of the corresponding totals. Moreover, the
latest statistics show that while exports to the US decreased to 11.96% in
2016, exports to China grew to 26.36%. (6) China has served as Taiwan’s main
source of trade surplus. In terms of capital, Taiwan’s relationship with China
has intensified. To illustrate, since the Taiwanese government lifted its re-
striction on Taiwanese investment in China in 1991, China has gradually be-
come the most popular location for Taiwanese people to invest. As Table 1
shows, Taiwanese investments in China steadily rose from 1991 and even
surpassed all Taiwanese outward investments in other foreign countries from
2002. Though there have been signs of Taiwanese businesses starting to
transfer investments from China to other countries since 2015, China still
abstracted more than twice as many investments as Japan, Taiwan’s second
largest investment target, in 2016. (7) Similarly, after the Taiwanese govern-
ment incrementally loosened its restrictions on Chinese investments in cer-
tain Taiwanese industries starting from 2009, increasing direct investment
flows from China to Taiwan have appeared. (8)
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4. The Taiwan Bureau of Foreign Trade, “Trade Statistics #FSC3040: Ranking of Total Trade, Exports,
and Imports for Taiwan’s Trading Partners,” 2016, http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/FSCI/ (accessed on 7
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5. Ibid.
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7. The Taiwan Investment Commission, “Statistics Monthly Report (January 2017),” 2017,
http://www.moeaic.gov.tw/news.view?do=data&id=1135&lang=ch&type=business_ann (ac-
cessed on 7 March 2017).
8. Ibid.
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Figure 2 – Taiwan's press freedom index by Reporters Without Borders











Note: The higher the score, the lower the level of press freedom.
Source: Reporters Without Borders, “World Press Freedom Index 2016,” 2016, https://rsf.org/en/ranking (accessed on 7 March 2017)
China was eager to reinforce this structure of economic dependence by
incorporating Taiwan into its international economic order. As a rising re-
gional hegemon, China has sought to counter American hegemony to es-
tablish an alternative world order since the 2000s. In 2003, the phrase
“peaceful rise” (heping jueqi) was proposed by the Chinese government to
describe its national development blueprint for the twenty-first century.
The government later replaced “rise” with “development” in 2004, to soften
the perception that China would threaten the established world order. How-
ever, “peaceful development” (heping fazhan) was understood as China’s
new national development strategy, which sought to internally establish a
series of Chinese-style “harmonious” political, economic, and social insti-
tutions, and externally establish an alternative world order by challenging
the hegemonic status of the US (Shiau 2004, p. 24). Regarding regional eco-
nomic order, China did not embrace the prospect of open-regionalism ad-
vocated by the US and other Asia-Pacific developed countries, involving
strengthening cooperation between East Asia and other regions and realising
financial and trade liberalisation. Instead, China undertook to promote an-
other version of regionalism in which East Asian states cooperated with one
another to confront US-led open-regionalism and globalisation (hiau 2004,
pp. 10-11). As part of the CCP’s unification strategy towards Taiwan, Beijing
has also long attempted to “promote unification by economic means” (yi
jing cu tong), that is, to facilitate cross-Strait political reconciliation and ul-
timate reunification by intensifying China’s economic and trade ties with
Taiwan, although Beijing has never abandoned the possibility of unifying
Taiwan by force. Therefore, to isolate Taiwan from international connections
and absorb Taiwan into its international economic order, China prevented
Taiwan from signing FTAs with Taiwan’s important trading partners through-
out the 2000s, and encouraged Taiwan to sign the Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China in 2010 by surrendering part of
its own profits (Tung 2011, p. 109, 112). (9)
Alongside expanding economic ties between Taiwan and China, an increas-
ing number of government-business networks have been constituted across
the Taiwan Strait since the 2000s, such as the Boao Forum for Asia, the
Cross-Strait Economic and Cultural Forum, the Straits Forum, the Cross-
Strait CEO Summit, and national and local Taiwanese business associations
in China. Through these networks, Taiwanese entrepreneurs seeking to do
business in China have opportunities to pursue economic benefits from the
Chinese government; meanwhile, Chinese authorities with regulatory pow-
ers over economic activities in China also gain opportunities to secure Tai-
wanese capitalists’ loyalty by offering privileges and special favours (Wu
2015, 2016). The cross-Strait media sector is no exception. To strengthen
China’s media warfare against Taiwan, former Chinese President Hu Jintao
announced ‘‘Entering the Island, Entering the Household, and Entering the
Mind’’ (rudao, ruhu, ruxin) as a new principle of the CCP’s unification pro-
paganda towards Taiwan at the Central People’s Broadcasting Station’s 50th
anniversary of its first broadcast to Taiwan on 12 August 2004. For this pur-
pose, Beijing has endeavoured to narrow Taiwanese media’s access to in-
ternational institutions and events, and to actively create communication
networks with Taiwanese media organisations and officials (Cook 2013,
p. 30, 32). For instance, Taiwanese media owners and professionals are reg-
ularly invited to participate in government-hosted media forums in China,
such as the Straits Forums. Directed by the Straits Exchange Foundation of
Taiwan, Taiwanese media shareholders, editors, and managers organised their
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first “Media Executives Delegation”
to China in October 2009, during
which they met Wang Yi, Director
of the State Council Taiwan Affairs
Office of China, and Chen Yunlin,
Chairman of the Association for
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits
of China. Upon the Chinese au-
thorities’ request, some Taiwanese
media officials were even selected
to attend “closed-door meetings”
in Beijing to be educated on the
Chinese central government’s
guidelines for managing public






economic dependence on China,
Taiwanese media companies be-
came increasingly commercially tied to the Chinese market from the 2000s
onward. An academic survey conducted in the mid-2000s found that 38.4%
of Taiwanese media companies had expanded their businesses overseas and
over 90% were doing business in China. While the overseas business volume
represented an average of 34% of a media company’s total business volume,
the business volume in China generally accounted for 40% of the total over-
seas business volume. China was therefore the most important overseas mar-
ket. Furthermore, 30% of those who had not yet entered the Chinese market
expressed their expectation to do so shortly (Chen 2006, pp. 57-58, 60, 68).
Taiwanese media companies especially craved financial resources from China
to improve their finances when advertising revenues from Taiwanese private
enterprises declined due to the 2008 financial crisis, compounded by lost
revenues following the prohibition of government-sponsored embedded
marketing in 2011 (Chung 2012, pp. 67-70).
Under these circumstances, the Chinese government has had more op-
portunities to co-opt Taiwanese media companies as instruments for its
hegemonic and unification propaganda towards Taiwan, by either offering
financial resources in the Chinese circulation, advertising, and capital mar-
kets, or threatening to deny access to the profitable Chinese market. As an
authoritarian regime with strict media censorship, the Chinese government
is devoted to preventing its domestic media from covering certain forbidden
topics (such as the Tiananmen Incident, Taiwan independence, Tibetan or
Xinjiang autonomy, and Falun Gong), and it also endeavours to guide editors
and journalists to express views the government favours (such as those
stimulating people’s identification with the CCP, patriotism, and animosity
against external threats) (Kurlantzick and Link 2009). To ensure their cor-
porate interests in China, many Taiwanese media companies, regardless of
their positions on the unification-independence issue, have started to co-
operate with Beijing’s mass communication policies by adjusting their news
editing principles according to “hidden rules” (qian gui ze) (10) that favour
the Chinese authorities. Generally, Taiwanese media are discouraged from
presenting sensitive issues that might annoy the Chinese authorities (con-
sistent with the aforementioned forbidden topics for China’s media). In-
stead, Taiwanese media are encouraged to promote perspectives
propagandised by the Chinese government, such as social harmony, cross-
Strait exchange, mutual understanding, and peaceful development (Cook
2013, pp. 25-26). (11)
Circulation
Given China’s huge circulation market of 1.3 billion people, many Tai-
wanese media companies have sought to establish offices, circulate news-
papers, broadcast TV programs, and provide access to websites there to earn
more subscriptions, copyright fees, and advertising revenue (Lee 2014, pp.
133-134). (12) However, the Chinese government explicitly or implicitly re-
quires these companies to conform to Chinese censorship, not only in China
but also in Taiwan in exchange for circulation revenue and subsequent ad-
vertising income from China. This applied to both print and electronic media.
For instance, the two traditional newspapers in Taiwan, the China Times
and the UDN, have been striving to distribute their newspapers in China
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10. Interview with Lu Dong-Shi, former president of the Taiwan Journalists Association, Taipei, 24  June
2014; interview with Ni Yen-Yuan, former chief editorial writer of the China Times, Taipei, 16 July
2014; interview with Anonymous Interviewee, senior manager of United Daily News Television,
11 July 2014; interview with Anonymous Interviewee, senior editor of SET, 30 July 2014; interview
with Feng Sylvia, founder of the Alliance for the Birth of Public Media and former general manager
of the Taiwan Public Television Service (PTS), Taipei, 13 August 2014.
11. Interview with Lu Dong-Shi; interview with Ho Jung-hsing, founder and former president of the
Taiwan Journalists Association, Taipei, 14 July 2014; interview with Hu Yuan-Hui, former general
manager of the Taiwan Television Enterprise and former president of the Central News Agency,
Taipei, 25 July 2014.
12. Interview with Lu Dong-Shi; interview with Chen Hsiao-yi, president of the Taiwan Journalists As-
sociation, Taipei, 27 June 2014; interview with Ho Jung-hsing; interview with Hu Yuan-Hui; inter-
view with Su Tzen-ping, former director of the Government Information Office and former
chairman of the Central News Agency, Taipei, 28 July 2014; interview with Lee Chih-Te, senior
news reporter of Radio Free Asia, Taipei, 19 August 2014.
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Source: The Taiwan Bureau of Foreign Trade, “Trade Statistics #FSC3040: Ranking of Total Trade, Exports, and Imports for Taiwan's Trad-
ing Partners,” 2016, http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/FSCI/ (accessed on 7 March 2017).
since the 1990s. The UDN even won the special right to directly print and
distribute its newspaper in Dongguan, China on 1 April 2006. (13) For such
privileges to be granted by China’s State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, both
newspapers had to prevent their news reports and commentaries from an-
noying the Chinese authorities. The UDN even frequently carried embedded
advertisements for Chinese local governments in its mainland edition. De-
spite these privileges, the circulation of both Taiwanese newspapers in China
has still been restricted to certain regions, organisations, and people, such
as Taiwanese enterprises, foreign businesses, five-star hotels, and academic
institutions for Taiwan studies. (14)
Regarding television media, there are several examples. According to
Hu Yuan-Hui (former General Manager of Taiwan Television Enterprise
[TTV]), TTV planned to establish new offices in Beijing and other cities
in China in 2001. However, the Chinese government passed a clear mes-
sage to TTV’s management via a TTV reporter: no permit for the new
offices would be issued until broadcasting of a TTV program about Falun
Gong was halted. The permit’s issuance was continually delayed while
the Falun Gong program was broadcast; it was only issued when the pro-
gram was terminated as originally scheduled by TTV. (15) Due to this in-
cident, most Taiwanese media planning to enter the Chinese market
became reluctant to produce news reports and TV programs about Falun
Gong. (16)
Even pro-Taiwanese identity television companies, such as FTV and SET,
strive to sell the copyrights of their TV programs and dramas to China for ad-
ditional financial income (Cook 2013, pp. 32-33; Hsu 2014, pp. 526-528;
Kawakami 2015, p. 18), (17) especially after the decline of their advertising rev-
enues due to the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011 prohibition of govern-
ment-sponsored embedded marketing (Chung 2012, pp. 67-70). In particular,
FTV sought cooperation with state broadcaster China Central Television to
have some Taiwanese-language soap operas dubbed into Mandarin Chinese
and broadcasted in China. Probably to smooth such business transaction, FTV
tended to avoid broadcasting TV programs on
topics deemed sensitive to Beijing. For instance,
as the founder of FTV and a Central Standing
Committee member of the Democratic Progres-
sive Party (DPP), Chai Trong-rong declined a mid-
2009 proposal in the DPP Central Standing
Committee for FTV to purchase and broadcast
the film “The Ten Conditions of Love,” a docu-
mentary about Rebiya Kadeer, the Xinjiang inde-
pendence movement’s spiritual leader (Hsu
2014). (18)
Similarly, SET has been striving to broadcast
their TV dramas in China since 2008. Its presi-
dent, Chang Jung-hua, even replaced the term
“Taiwanese drama” (tai ju) with the SET-created
term “Chinese drama” (hua ju) in December
2011 to facilitate SET’s business in China. How-
ever, China’s National Broadcasting Headquar-
ters, an institution holding power to approve
the broadcasting of the dramas from abroad,
hinted that SET should axe “Big Talk News”
(dahua xinwen), a popular pro-Taiwanese iden-
tity, anti-Beijing political talk show in Taiwan, to
smoothen its business in China. Consequently,
Big Talk News was finally cancelled in May 2012, under pressure from the
Chines authorities (Chung 2012, pp. 27, 33-34, 39, 52, 78). (19)
A similar phenomenon struck internet media. According to a media survey
conducted from 12 January to 1 April 2015, the amount of Taiwanese media
web content blocked in China basically mirrored the level of the media’s
friendliness/animosity towards Beijing. For instance, while the websites of
the pro-Taiwanese identity Liberty Times and the anti-Communist Apple
Daily were respectively 95% and 92% blocked in China, those of the pro-
Chinese unification newspapers UDN and China Times, for example, were
respectively 67% and 0% blocked. (20) Taiwanese media apparently needed
to avoid using keywords deemed sensitive in China to ensure a high level
of traffic flow in Chinese cyberspace and benefit from the accompanying
advertising revenues. (21)
Advertising
In addition to the circulation market, the Chinese government also incor-
porated Taiwanese media companies into the advertising market. From the
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Taipei, 13 June 2014.
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25 May 2012; Hsiao-Tzu Sun, “Cheng Hung-Yi Says Goodbye to the Big Talk News,” The Journalist,
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20. The United Daily News Group New Media Lab, “Taiwanese Media under China’s Great Firewall,”
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late 2000s, China’s State Council Taiwan Affairs Office and provincial/mu-
nicipal governments became eager to provide Taiwanese media with em-
bedded advertisements promoting Chinese business and tourism, (22) treating
the recipients as their propaganda channels in Taiwan. According to the in-
vestigation report of the Control Yuan of Taiwan, though such advertise-
ments were illegal in Taiwan, (23) China Times and UDN still illegally accepted
financial resources from Chinese provincial/municipal governments and car-
ried numerous embedded advertisements regarding tourism promotion
since 2010 at the latest (Hung, Yang, and Chen 2014, pp. 13-19; Lee 2014,
p. 121). (24)
The Want Want Group even established the Want Want-China Times
Cultural Media agency in Beijing to subcontract advertising packages
from the Chinese authorities to other media firms in Taiwan. As New
Talk’s investigation report revealed, when the Governor of China’s Fujian
Province visited Taiwan in March 2012, the Want Want-China Times
Media Group cooperated with the propaganda plan of the Fujian Provin-
cial Government and the Amoy Municipal Government, receiving money
from both via Want Want-China Times Cultural Media in Beijing, then
carrying a series of relevant embedded news items in China Times and
its affiliated newspapers throughout the governor’s Taiwan visit (Lee
2014, pp. 118-127). (25)
Capital
The Chinese government also incorporated Taiwanese media compa-
nies into the capital market. In particular, it has sought to purchase
ownership of Taiwanese media companies with official financial spon-
sorship. As Boxun revealed in its late-2010 investigation reports, China’s
State Council Taiwan Affairs Office has prepared a huge amount of cap-
ital, at least US$300 million, with the clearly identified purpose of pur-
chasing stock in Taiwanese media companies such as Television
Broadcasts Satellite (TVBS) channels and the UDN Group’s affiliated
institutions. However, it is suspected that this vast sum was finally di-
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Table 1 – Investments across the Taiwan Strait, 1991-2016
Taiwan Investments in China China Investments in Taiwan
Taiwan Total Outward Investments
(excluding China)
(Unit: US$1,000)
Year Case Amount Case Amount Case Amount
1991 237 174,158 365 1,656,231
1992 264 246,992 300 887,259
1993 1,262 1,140,365 326 1,661,046
1994 934 962,209 324 1,616,844
1995 490 1,092,713 339 1,356,878
1996 383 1,229,241 470 2,165,404
1997 728 1,614,542 759 2,893,826
1998 641 1,519,209 896 3,296,302
1999 488 1,252,780 774 3,269,013
2000 840 2,607,142 1,391 5,077,062
2001 1,186 2,784,147 1,387 4,391,654
2002 1,490 3,858,757 925 3,370,046
2003 1,837 4,594,985 714 3,968,588
2004 2,000 6,939,912 658 3,382,022
2005 1,287 6,002,029 521 2,447,449
2006 897 7,375,197 478 4,315,426
2007 779 9,676,420 464 6,469,978
2008 482 9,843,355 387 4,466,491
2009 249 6,058,497 23 37,486 251 3,005,554
2010 518 12,230,146 79 94,345 247 2,823,451
2011 575 13,100,871 105 51,625 306 3,696,827
2012 454 10,924,406 138 331,583 321 8,098,641
2013 440 8,684,904 138 349,479 373 5,232,266
2014 388 9,829,805 136 334,631 493 7,293,683
2015 321 10,398,224 170 244,067 462 10,745,195
2016 252 9,183,992 158 247,628 496 12,123,094
Source: The Taiwan Investment Commission (2017)
verted and transferred to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other countries be-
fore 2007. (26)
The Chinese government also encouraged some Taiwanese capitalists with
business interests based in China to purchase ownership of Taiwanese media
companies. Take the Want Want Group, for example. Beginning with man-
ufacturing and selling rice crackers in Taiwan, the group started to expand
its food business to the Chinese market from 1989, subsequently becoming
the largest manufacturer of rice cakes and flavoured milk in China, and in-
vesting in hotels, hospitals, insurance, and real estate there. (27) Unexpectedly,
the Want Want Group suddenly purchased the China Times in 2008 and
further merged with China Television (CTV) and Chung Tien Television
(CtiTV) in 2009. In an interview, Tsai Eng-meng denied being the agent sent
by Beijing to purchase the China Times Group, but he admitted knowledge
that China’s State Council Taiwan Affairs Office had tried to commission
agents to do so. (28) However, according to a senior Taiwanese government
official, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office actually cooperated with a senior
Kuomintang (KMT) leader to convince Tsai Eng-meng to purchase the group
under the direction of the CCP’s Publicity Department, to prevent its ac-
quisition by the anti-communist Next Media Group (Hsu 2014, p. 520). After
purchasing the China Times in November 2008, Tsai Eng-meng immediately
met with Wang Yi, head of China’s State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, in
December 2008. There, Tsai Eng-meng expressed to Wang Yi that one of his
goals in merging with the China Times Group was to “advance the further
development of cross-Strait relations with the power of the media.” Wang
Yi replied that the Taiwan Affairs Office would support the Want Want
Group’s food and media businesses uncompromisingly. (29)
Probably inspired by the experiences of some pro-Beijing capitalists in
Hong Kong, some Taiwanese capitalists with business interests based in
China considered purchasing media ownership in Taiwan as a strategy to
increase their political leverage for receiving investment subsidies and other
potential business favours from the Chinese government. (30) For instance,
after merging with the China Times Group, the Want Want Group received
numerous embedded advertising fees from the Chinese authorities and its
Chinese subsidiary company, Want Want China Holdings Limited, also re-
ceived US$47 million in Chinese official subsidies in 2011, which accounted
for 11.3% of its total net profit. (31) Moreover, the Want Want Group has
been striving for special benefits from the Chinese government through its
media influence. For example, when the State Council of China issued Doc-
ument Number 62 in November 2014, which aimed to cancel and recover
all tax preferences offered by local governments to foreign investors without
the central government’s prior approval, the Want Want Group cooperated
with Taiwan’s six major industrial and commercial associations, Taiwanese
businesses associations in China, and the Taiwanese government-sponsored
Straits Exchange Foundation to request reservation of, or at least compen-
sation for, the tax preferences previously approved for Taiwanese businesses.
In particular, the Want Want Group held forums for Taiwanese businesses
during April 2015 and produced extensive relevant coverage via its print
and electronic media. In response, the State Council of China decided to re-
store all the favours local governments had already offered and already
agreed to offer to Taiwanese businesses in May 2015.
Furthermore, probably encouraged by Tsai becoming closer to the Chinese
authorities after purchasing the China Times Group, some Taiwanese capi-
talists started to engage in the Taiwanese media sector with the expectation
of obtaining potential interests for their enterprises in China (Cook 2013,
p. 9; Hsu 2014, p. 534). For instance, the Ting Hsin Group, the largest instant
noodle producer in China, acquired China Network Systems in Taiwan in Au-
gust 2014. Similarly, Wang Cher, president of the High-Tech Computer Cor-
poration (HTC) (a mobile phone company largely basing its manufacturing
and sales in China), purchased a considerable percentage of the stocks of
the TVBS Media Group in June 2011, later gaining full control over the group
in January 2015. Taken together, following the example of Hong Kong cap-
italists and Tsai Eng-meng, a trend appeared of using media ownership in
Taiwan as an instrument for fighting for corporate interests in China.
Routinizing external-oriented self-
censorship in Taiwan
Embedded in the Chinese circulation, advertising, and capital markets,
many Taiwanese media companies, regardless of their positions on the uni-
fication-independence issue, had incentives to accommodate the corporate
and market structures of the media to Beijing’s rules on mass communica-
tion. Such structural changes, in turn, facilitated and even routinized Tai-
wanese media’s self-censorship and subsequent news biases favouring the
Chinese authorities.
Regarding financial structure, many Taiwanese media companies relied in-
creasingly on their financial resources in China, especially after the key
aforementioned developments in 2008 and 2011 (Chung 2012, pp. 67-70).
FTV and SET, among others, strove for opportunities to sell copyrights and
broadcast TV programs in the Chinese market. Conversely, the Want Want-
China Times Media Group and UDN, for example, received subscriptions,
advertising fees, and some other special benefits from the Chinese author-
ities. The Want Want Group even accepted subsidies from the Chinese gov-
ernment.
Regarding organisational structure, the editorial department was increas-
ingly pressed to cooperate with the media owner, business department, or
programming department, with editorial independence partly restrained
and self-censorship exercised regarding Chinese sensitive topics to ensure
the continuation of financial resources coming from China. In the Want
Want-China Times Media Group, the staff and businesses devoted to cross-
Strait affairs at the China Times were even moved from the political division
to the mainland centre within two years of the 2008 merger, as news re-
ports about China and cross-Strait relations came under direct control of
the new owner and high-level managers. (32) In addition, a new newspaper
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named Want Daily was also established by the group in August 2009 to
focus on providing Chinese and cross-Strait information and improving mu-
tual understanding between China and Taiwan.
In the news editing process, there were generally two patterns of self-cen-
sorship: first, top-down, in which the owner explicitly or implicitly delivered
his ideas about news editing and reporting to the chief editor, the chief ed-
itorial writers, and other high-level managers through weekly executive
meetings or other informal communications; and second, bottom-up, in
which reporters and editors tried to discern the owner’s ideas themselves
and then slanted news and opinion content to cater to the owner. Initially,
the functioning of either pattern was largely based on the owner holding
the highest power to decide on employee retention and promotion. (33)
However, through a daily process of socialisation in the corporate hierarchy,
this self-censorship became a culture that reporters and editors grew ac-
customed to, took for granted, and finally complied with as a matter of
course (Kawakami 2015, p. 19).
With these corporate structures adjusted, the media content of many Tai-
wanese news organisations was partially slanted in favour of the Chinese
authorities. Such news biases occurred especially in media firms already
embedded in the Chinese market, rather than those not yet there. For in-
stance, Tsai Eng-meng was suspected of increasing editorial pressure to
whitewash content regarding the Tiananmen Incident, Tibet independence,
Xinjiang autonomy, and Falun Gong in both the news and opinion pages of
the China Times; (34) however, he encouraged coverage of the bright side of
China, which contributed to mutual understanding and harmonious devel-
opment across the Taiwan Strait. (35) According to Chang Chin-Hwa’s re-
search, China Times and UDN, as newspapers accepting embedded
advertisements from the Chinese authorities, tended to employ a more de-
tailed, positive approach to reporting news about Chinese leaders and their
official visits to Taiwan, compared to the two other major newspapers (i.e.,
Apple Daily and Liberty Times) (Chang Chin-Hwa 2011; Hung, Yang, and
Chen 2014). Similarly, when covering the Xinjiang conflicts, China Times
and UDN, compared to their two major rivals in Taiwan, also clearly tended
to conform to the “China official frame.” In particular, 100% and 77.78%
of the related reports in China Times and UDN were based exclusively on
Chinese official news sources. Moreover, 100% and 83.33% of the news re-
ports in China Times and UDN ascribed responsibility for the conflicts com-
pletely to the protesters, rather than the regime. Moreover, both newspapers
failed to include a diverse view of human rights in news reports on these
conflicts: in particular, state violations of human rights such as liberty, due
process of law, and ethnic autonomy were rarely mentioned (Chang Chin-
Hwa 2015). The situation was even worse on the opinion pages. The China
Times’s opinion page, traditionally regarded as a liberal sphere for public
discussion, is now considered a “mouthpiece of the Chinese government”
that has become increasingly obvious in its promotion of China’s official
viewpoints, defence of the images of Beijing and its incumbents, and even
refutation of the Taiwanese majority’s perspectives. (36)
A similar phenomena occurred in the pro-Taiwanese identity media. Ac-
cording to a SET senior news editor, in response to Beijing’s warning to
refuse the broadcasting of its drama in China, the SET management estab-
lished an implicit principle of news reporting to its news department in
2008 to reduce reports about the Tiananmen Incident, Tibet independence,
and Falun Gong. (37) An academic report found that SET has presented fewer
pieces of news on Tiananmen every year, starting from 2010 at the latest
(Hung, Yang, and Chen 2014, pp. 19-23).
Concerning market structure, the expansion of pro-Beijing capitalists in
media ownership reinforced the trend of media conglomeration and cross-
media convergence in Taiwan. In particular, having purchased China Times in
2008, and merged with CTV and CtiTV in 2009, the Want Want Group further
proposed to acquire China Network Systems in 2011. Although this proposal
was ultimately rejected by Taiwan’s National Communications Commission
in 2013, the group still successfully grew into a cross-media conglomerate.
Such merger and acquisition actions were considered by many as a threat
to the diversity of news and opinions offered to the Taiwanese public. (38) For
instance, when the Want Want Group’s proposal to merge with China Net-
work Systems provoked a large-scale anti-media monopoly demonstration
in Taiwan on 31 July 2012, most cable television stations failed to report it
for fear of offending such a large media conglomerate (Chung 2012, pp. 81-
84). The public’s concerns about media concentration and news biases, in
turn, induced the formulation of anti-media monopoly legislation from Jan-
uary 2013, which remains in progress at present.
Conclusion
This paper proposes a theoretical framework to systematise how the Chi-
nese government extends its influence on extra-jurisdictional media. It ar-
gues that a media company outside China will exercise self-censorship on
topics considered sensitive in China when it becomes commercially tied
with the Chinese market. With archival and interview data gathered in Tai-
wan, a case study based on the method of process tracing was conducted
on the Want Want-China Times Media Group, UDN, FTV, and SET, among
other Taiwanese media companies. The case study basically supports the
proposed theory.
The findings are summarised as follows. First, at the international level, as
a rising regional hegemon, China was eager to make Taiwan economically
dependent to facilitate directing its hegemonic and unification propaganda
towards Taiwan. Second, at the sectoral level, due to Taiwan’s increasing eco-
nomic dependence on China, the Chinese government had more opportu-
nities to co-opt Taiwanese media capitalists as its local collaborators in
Taiwan, offering them financial interests in the Chinese circulation, adver-
tising, and capital markets. Such financial co-optation worked upon both
pro-Chinese unification and pro-Taiwanese identity media in Taiwan. Third,
at the corporate level, the Chinese government, assisted by Taiwanese media
capitalists, implemented and even routinized self-censorship on Chinese
sensitive topics by urging Taiwanese media companies to adjust their cor-
porate and market structures to accommodate Beijing’s mass communica-
tion policies. Through these three steps, the Chinese government succeeded
in “outsourcing” its censorship to private media companies in Taiwan.
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This paper has several implications. First, it resonates with Kurlantzick and
Link’s model of the “commercialisation of censorship,” as well as Wu Jieh-
min’s model of the “China factor” influence mechanism. By integrating the
two models into a theoretical framework, this paper extends the “commer-
cialisation of censorship” beyond China to the international level, and ap-
plies the “China factor” model to Taiwan’s mass media. The proposed
theoretical framework is therefore potentially applicable to other countries
whose media may suffer from censorship diffused from China.
Second, the paper’s findings are not only relevant to Taiwan but may also
apply to many other countries that have been or will be subject to China’s
economic influence. Given the current trend of China’s economic rise, con-
cerns are increasing regarding China’s potential impact on human rights and
democracy in its neighbouring countries and even globally (Link 2002; Di-
amond 2009; Kurlantzick and Link 2009; Ambrosio 2010; Wu 2012; Kurlantz-
ick 2013; Pillsbury 2015; Nathan 2015). If this impact does transpire, Taiwan,
as the country in which China’s interest is most intense, is most likely to be
the first affected. Therefore, the paper’s value may move beyond Taiwan by
applying it to many other countries whose levels of media freedom are likely
to suffer through increasing economic linkages with China.
Finally, for liberal states around China, one policy implication may be to
design institutions to protect the media from inappropriate intervention
of not only state power and market forces domestically but also political
and economic forces from abroad. For instance, while Taiwan’s media
stopped receiving embedded advertisements from the Taiwanese govern-
ment from 2011 onward, some continued receiving embedded advertise-
ments from the Chinese authorities via subcontracts with Taiwanese
businesses. It seems necessary for liberal states to establish more effective
institutions to withstand external political intervention in the media
through economic activities.
z Huang Jaw-Nian is Assistant Professor at the Graduate Institute of
China Studies, Tamkang University. 
Graduate Institute of China Studies, Tamkang University, No.151
Yingzhuan Rd., Tamsui Dist., New Taipei City 25137, Taiwan
( jnhuang@mail.tku.edu.tw).
Article received on 6 December 2016. Accepted on 16 March 2017.
36 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 7 / 3
Articles
References 
AMBROSIO, Thomas. 2010. “Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffu-
sion: Concepts, Dynamics, and Future Research.” International Studies Perspec-
tives 11(4): 375–92.
CHANG, Chin-Hwa. 2011. “Analysis of the News Placement and Coverage of
Three Chinese Buying Groups by Taiwan’s Four Main Newspapers from the Per-
spective of van Dijk’s Discourse and Manipulation Theory.” Chinese Journal of
Communication Research 20: 65–93.
CHANG, Chin-Hwa. 2015. “How Different Newspapers Cover Xingjian Conflicts
from Human Right Perspective? A Frame Analysis of 10 Newspapers from Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Mainland China, Britain and Unites States.” Mass Communication
Research 125: 1–47.
CHANG, Mau-Kuei. 2011. “Advocating of the Perspective of ‘China Impact Stud-
ies’.” Taiwanese Sociological Association Communication 72: 25-30.
CHEN, Ping-Hung. 2006. “Market Entry Modes and Determinants of Taiwanese
Media Firms into Mainland China.” Mass Communication Research 89.
CHUNG, Nien-huang. 2012. My Life Experience in the Big Talk News.Taipei: Avan-
guard.
COOK, Sarah. 2013. The Long Shadow of Chinese Censorship: How the Commu-
nist Party’s Media Restrictions Affect News Outlets Around the World. Washing-
ton, DC: The Center for International Media Assistance, National Endowment for
Democracy.
DIAMOND, Larry. 2009. “The Shape of Global Democracy.” Brown Journal of
World Affairs 15(2): 77-86.
GAT, Azar. 2007. “The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers.” Foreign Affairs 86:
59-69.
GEORGE, Alexander L., and Andrew BENNETT. 2005. Case Studies and Theory
Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School.
205-232.
HSU, Chien-Jung. 2014. “China’s Influence on Taiwan’s Media.” Asian Survey
54(3): 515-39.
HUNG, Yao-nan, Hsiu-Jing YANG, and Chun-Wei CHEN. 2014. How Did China
Factor Influence Taiwanese Media? Taipei: Graduate Institute of National Devel-
opment, National Taiwan University.
KAWAKAMI, Momoko. 2015. “Political Permeation under the Market Mechanism:
The Mechanisms of China’s Influence in the Taiwanese Media Industry.” Tai-
wanese Sociological Association Communication 83: 17-20.
KURLANTZICK, Joshua, and Perry LINK. 2009. “China: Resilient, Sophisticated Au-
thoritarianism.” in Christopher Walker (ed.), Undermining Democracy: 21st Cen-
tury Authoritarians. Washington, DC: Freedom House. 13-28.
KURLANTZICK, Joshua. 2013. Democracy in Retreat: The Revolt of the Middle
Class and the Worldwide Decline of Representative Government. New Haven,
Conn. and London: Yale University Press.
LEE, Chih-Te. 2014. Journey Without Destination. New Taipei: Gusa.
LINK, Perry. 2002. “The Anaconda in the Chandelier: Chinese Censorship Today.”
The New York Review of Books April 11.
MA, Ngok. 2007. “State-Press Relationship in Post-1997 Hong Kong: Constant
Negotiation Amidst Self-Restraint.” The China Quarterly 192: 949-970.
NATHAN, Andrew J. 2015. “China’s Challenge.” Journal of Democracy 26(1): 156–
70.
PILLSBURY, Michael. 2015. The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy
to Replace America as the Global Superpower. New York: Henry Holt and Co.
SARTORI, Giovanni. 1970. “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” The
American Political Science Review 64(4): 1033–1053.
SCIUTTO, James E. 1996. “China’s Muffling of the Hong Kong Media.” Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 547: 131-43.
SHIAU, Chyuan-jenq. 2004. “On the ‘Peaceful Rise’ of China.” Political Science
Review 22.
TUNG, Chen-Yuan. 2011. “The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement: Controversy and Effects.” Journal of National Development Studies
11(1).
WU, Jieh-min. 2012. The Third View of China. Taipei: Taiwan, Rive Gauche.
WU, Jieh-min. 2015. “The China Factor and Its Local Collaboration Mechanisms:
An Analytical Framework.” Taiwanese Sociological Association Communication
83: 5-8.
WU, Jieh-min. 2016. “The China Factor in Taiwan: Impact and Response.” in
Gunter Schubert (ed.), Handbook of Modern Taiwan Politics and Society. New
York, NY: Routledge. 425–45.
